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Abstract
The business of money creation is conceptually distinct from that
of intermediation. Yet, these two activities are frequently–but not
always–combined together in the form of a banking system. We
develop a simple model to examine the question: When is banking
essential? There is a role for money due to a lack of record-keeping
and a role for intermediation due to the existence of private informa-
tion: both money and intermediation are essential. When monitoring
costs associated with intermediation are suﬃciently low, the two ac-
tivities can be separated from one another. However, when monitoring
costs are suﬃciently high, a banking system that combines these two
activities is essential.
1 Introduction
We view a banking system as an institutional structure that combines two
primary activities: liquidity provision and intermediation. We define liquid-
ity provision as the supply of payments instruments and intermediation as
the pooling, monitoring, and transformation of individual securities into al-
ternative debt instruments. These two activities are conceptually distinct;
a point highlighted by Friedman (1960), among others. In both theory and
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practice, liquidity provision can occur in the absence of intermediation and
intermediation can occur in the absence of liquidity provision. Neverthe-
less, we frequently observe these two activities combined within institutional
structures that are commonly called “banks” or “banking systems.” To the
best of our knowledge, we are unaware of any theory that explains why
banking–the way in which we define it here–might be essential.1
The claim above is rather strong. A review of the literature will provide
some justification, or at least some qualification. In a series of papers, Caval-
canti andWallace (1999) and Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999, 2005),
develop models of fiat money and banking. But the banks are little more than
agents that provide a form of liquidity. There is no role for intermediation.
In contrast, models of financial intermediation, such as Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Peck and Shell (2003), and Green and Lin (2005), explain the emer-
gence of intermediated structures. But liabilities do not circulate. Similarly,
banks are indistinguishable from, say, insurance companies in Smith (2003)
since their liabilities do not circulate in any meaningful sense. Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2007) develop a model of money and banking. But the
banks in their model are not essential; they can be replaced with a market.
Finally, He, Huang and Wright (2005) develop a model of money and bank-
ing that is in some respects similar to our own. In particular, some agents in
their model are endowed with commitment power. However, absent any role
for fiat money–which is introduced by way of a legal restriction–a bank
is reduced to an agent who can issue non-intermediated inside money. By
restricting note-issue to the government domain, banks in their model issue
liabilities against safe repositories of cash. While this safe-keeping function
might be thought of as a legitimate form of intermediation, it is not the role
that we stress below.
Naturally, our review of the literature above should not be construed as
a criticism, as most of these papers do not focus on the question of whether
a banking system is essential. The one exception to this may be He, Huang
and Wright (2005), although their work is better thought of as emphasizing
a diﬀerent aspect of the business of banking. Our own approach is to ignore
any meaningful role for fiat money. While fiat money plays an important role
in modern economies–and arguably, in highly primitive ones–it seems clear
1By banking being essential we mean that more desirable allocations can be achieved
if we combine the activities of liquidity provision and intermediation under one roof, com-
pared to having them supplied by separate entities.
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that the development of banking and private money preceded the widespread
use of government-issued fiat money (Hicks, 1989). Instead, we adopt a sim-
ple finite-horizon model, similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (2002), to introduce
the need for a circulating medium. Moreover, to distinguish the business of
banking from insurance, we abstract from insurance motives entirely by as-
suming risk-neutral agents. Intermediation in our model is instead motivated
by the need for a delegated monitor, along the lines suggested by Diamond
(1984) and Williamson (1986).
Our model emphasizes two key frictions, both of which feature promi-
nently in the literatures on money and banking. The first friction is the ab-
sence of a public-access record-keeping device. The second friction is private
information over the returns that are realized across individual investment
projects. In the absence of either friction, the economy functions perfectly
well without anything that one might label as money or as a banking system.
Absent a record-keeping device, a tangible medium of exchange is essential.
When private information is introduced and monitoring is costly, some sort
of intermediated structure–a delegated monitor–is essential. It is, however,
by no means obvious that it is essential for the agents that are responsible
for money-issue must also be responsible for providing intermediation ser-
vices. Our main result is that even when money and intermediation are both
essential, banking is inessential when monitoring costs are suﬃciently low.
However, a banking system is essential when monitoring costs become are
suﬃciently high.
2 The Benchmark Environment
There are three dates, three time-dated goods and three types of agents, all
labeled i = 1, 2, 3. There are N agents of each type, where N > 1 is a finite
integer. A type-i agent prefers good i to good i− 1 (modulo 3), but receives
no benefit from consuming good i + 1 (modulo 3).2 Preferences are linear
and given by
ci + εci−1,
where ci represents good i consumption and 0 < ε < 1.
Output is divisible and nonstorable. A type-i agent produces good i− 1
2In what follows, we will suppress the “modulo 3” qualification.
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at date i−1. Production outcomes are random at the individual level, where
agent i’s output realization–success or failure–is revealed at date i − 1.
There is no aggregate uncertainty. In particular, at each date F agents fail
to produce output, where 0 < F < N . From an individual perspective,
F/N represents the probability of failing to produce output. In the event of
success, an agent produces y > 0 units of output. Since there is no aggregate
uncertainty, total output at each date is given by (1−λ)Ny, where λ ≡ F/N .
Throughout, we assume that type-1 agents have a commitment technol-
ogy and that all other agents types do not. In the benchmark environment,
we assume that individual outputs are observable and that there is a public-
access record-keeping device. Later on, we modify this environment by first
removing the public-assess record-keeping device, and then by assuming that
individual outputs are private information. When output is assumed to be
private information–in section 5–we will introduce a monitoring technol-
ogy.
3 The Ex Ante Eﬃcient Allocation
Given our simple setup, the ex ante eﬃcient allocation should be obvious.
Since type-i agents value date i goods more than their own, a planner would
allocate all date i output (1− λ)Ny to type-i agents. Because agents are
risk-neutral, each type-i agent is indiﬀerent between mechanisms that, in
expectation, deliver (1− λ) y units of good i to him. Hence, an ex ante
eﬃcient allocation allows each agent to achieve an ex ante utility payoﬀ
equal to (1− λ)y.
The implementation scheme described below builds on the fact that: [1]
type-1 agents can commit; [2] output is observable; and [3] that there is
a public-access record-keeping device. There are potentially many ways to
implement the eﬃcient allocation. Here is one. The allocation of good i is
given by the following simple rule: the total amount of output surrendered to
a mechanism3 at date 1 is equally divided among all type-1 agents; the total
output surrendered to the mechanism at dates 2 and 3 is divided among the
type-2 and type-3 agents, respectively, in proportion to output surrendered
3A mechanism simply accepts and distributes output (and possibility other objects)
according to a prescribed rule.
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at dates 1 and 2. Agents play the following strategies: type-2 and type-3
agents surrender their output, if they have it, at dates 1 and 2, respectively;
and, type-1 agents promise to surrender their output, if they have it, at date
3.
It is easy to see that the above allocation rule and strategies constitute
an equilibrium. If all other agents play the proposed strategies, a type-2 or
type-3 agent who defects by consuming his own output receives a payoﬀ of
εy, which is less than the equilibrium payoﬀ of y. And, since type-1 agents
can commit, they will surrender their output at date 3.
4 Lack of Record-Keeping
The allocation rule and strategies described above are infeasible if a public-
access record-keeping device does not exist, since they rely on some form
of public memory. For trade to occur, some sort of physical and non-
counterfeitable object is needed, (Kocherlakota, 1998).
Standard monetary models feature an infinite horizon, a complete lack
of record-keeping and no commitment. In these environments, trade is fa-
cilitated by objects that are fiat in nature, such as intrinsically useless and
unbacked tokens. In contrast, our environment has a finite horizon with some
limited commitment in the form of type-1 agents’ ability to commit. Here,
monetary exchange can work oﬀ the fact that a subset of agents can commit
to redeem tokens. As we shall see below, whether these tokens are created
by society and endowed to type-1 agents, or whether type-1 agents create
tokens on their own is irrelevant in terms of implementable allocations. All
that is necessary is that some monetary object exist.
Imagine, then, that each type-1 agent is endowed with a divisible, durable,
and non-counterfeitable token. Consider the following allocation rules and
strategies. The allocation rule for output is similar to that described above:
the total amount of output surrendered to the mechanism at date i is divided
among the type-i agents in proportion to the amount of tokens they surren-
der. The allocation rule for tokens is: at date i the total amount of tokens
surrendered to the mechanism is divided among the type-i+1 agents in pro-
portion to the output they surrendered. Agents play the following strategies.
The strategy for tokens is: type-i agents surrender tokens at date i if they
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have them. The strategies for output are identical to the record-keeping en-
vironment: type-2 and and type-3 agents surrender their output, if they have
it, at dates 1 and 2, respectively; and, type-1 agents promise to surrender
their output, if they have it, at date 3.
The allocation rules and strategies have been constructed in a way that
makes it transparent that, in equilibrium, the supply of tokens serves as a
perfect substitute for the missing public-access record-keeping device. In
particular, if any type-2 or type-3 agent consumes his output, then he will
be unable to consume any of the date 2 or date 3 goods, respectively.
Before we proceed, some brief remarks on the fiat-like nature of money
are in order. While the tokens in the equilibrium described above do not have
any explicit backing, they are not really pure fiat instruments since type-1
agents commit to accept them as payment for their output. In this sense,
tokens are de facto backed by some commitment power. Therefore, instead
of endowing agents with tokens, we could alternatively assume that type-1
agents create them, with an explicit promise of to redeem them for output
in the future if they have it, and then use the above strategies and allocation
rules to implement an ex ante eﬃcient allocation.4 Under this interpretation,
tokens look a lot like inside money.5
4From a date-3 perspective, tokens issued by type-1 agents will be heterogenous;
some tokens are worth y–those issued by successful type-1 agents–and while others
are worthless–those issued by unsuccessful type-1 agents. But given the allocation rules
for tokens and goods, described above, the mechanism treats all type-1 money symmet-
rically. (We assume that agents surrendered their tokens before the output realizations
are observed.) Implicitly, one can interpret the symmetric treatment of date-1 tokens as a
form of intermediation. For example, suppose that at the beginning of date 3, all type-3
agents holding tokens, which are claims issued by type-1 agents, collectively pool them and
issue new claims or tokens against them that give the holder proportional share of total
output; this is done prior to the revelation of the type-1 agents’ date 3 output realizations.
Type-3 agents surrender output to the mechanism, type-3 agents (collectively) surrender
the tokens issued by type-1 agents, and the mechanism distributes output in proportion
to the type-3 tokens surrendered by type-3 agents. The act of the type-3 agents pooling
the tokens issued by type-1 agents and then re-issuing new “riskless” tokens is the form
of intermediation envisioned by Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986). Note, however,
that there is nothing fundamental about having a set of the type-3 agents acting as the
intermediary; in principle, type-1 or type-2 agents may also perform this task.
5The notion of inside money here is similar to that in Cavalanti and Wallace (1999). In
Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) agents who are monitored can issue money. In our setup,
we can re-interpret type-1 agents as being monitored and assume that there exists a court
that enforces contracts on the based on observables. Furthermore, since type-2 and type-3
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5 Private Information
We now assume that each agent’s production outcome is private information
and that type-1 agents can commit only to what is publically observable.6
In this situation, the strategies and allocation rules described in the previous
section no longer constitute an equilibrium. In particular, type-1 agents will
always have an incentive to that claim their output is zero–since output is
not publically observable–and those who actually produce y will consume it.
Without any further modifications to the environment, the only equilibrium
is autarky.
Following Townsend (1979) and Williamson (1986), we introduce a costly
monitoring technology. The technology works as follows. If a producing
agent fails to surrender his output, then the actual level of production–0 or
y–can be revealed if he is monitored. The cost of monitoring a producing
agent is μ ≥ 0 utils. The monitoring cost can be shared or spread out over
any number of agents. If, for example,M agents each expend μ/M utils, then
their combined eﬀort allows them to monitor one producing agent. Individual
monitoring costs, as well as the monitoring outcome, are observable.
It turns out that monitoring is relevant only at date 3, and that only
type-1 and type-3 agents would ever have an incentive to monitor.7 Type-3
agents may have an incentive to monitor because, in any equilibrium with
trade, they are holding tokens (or inside money) that can be used to purchase
the output they value. Note that because type-3 agents have no commitment
power, their decision to monitor must be sequentially rational. In contrast,
since type-1 agents can commitment, their decision to monitor (themselves)
need not respect sequential rationality.
We will define an intermediary as a set of agents who collectively perform
the task of monitoring.8 Since type-2 agents do not have an incentive to
agents are not monitored, they are not subject to the enforcement mechanism.
6If type-1 agents were able to commit unconditionally, then the introduction of private
information has no eﬀect on equilibrium outcomes. The assumption that (type-1) agents
can only commit to what is observable is standard in the literature, e.g., Townsend (1979)
and Williamson (1986).
7A type-2 agent would never monitor at date 3 since he does not value date-3 output
and cannot commit to monitoring.
8In footnote 4, we motivated the symmetric treatment of tokens, issued by type-1
agents, at date 3 as a form of intermediation. Continuing this line of discussion, in an
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monitor, they cannot be an intermediary.
5.1 Type-3 Intermediation
In this section, we consider strategies that can be interpreted as giving rise
to an institutional structure that separates money-issue and intermediation.
More specifically, we assume that type-1 agents are responsible for creat-
ing the economy’s monetary instrument and type-3 agents are collectively
responsible for intermediation. In terms of the timing of events for type-3
intermediation, we assume that the decision to monitor or not is made after
date-3 output is surrendered (by type-1 agents) and distributed (to type-3
agents). This timing serves to emphasize the fact that type-3 agents cannot
commit to future actions.
Consider the following equilibrium strategies and allocation rules, most of
which are identical to those described in the previous section. The allocation
rule for goods at date i is to divide the total amount of goods surrendered
to the mechanism at date i among the type-i agents in proportion to the
amount of tokens they surrendered. The allocation rule for tokens divides
the total amount of tokens surrendered to the mechanism at date i among
the type-i + 1 agents in proportion to the amount of output surrendered at
date i. The strategies for goods for type-i agents to surrender output if they
have it. In addition, (i) at date 1, each type-1 agent creates a token that
is redeemable for y units of date 3 output, if he has it; and (ii) successful
type-3 producers who surrender tokens at date 3 monitor all type-1 agents
who did not surrender output at date 3, if total date-3 output surrendered
is less than (N − F ) y; otherwise they do not monitor anyone.
The interesting questions to examine here are: [1] will successful type-
1 producers surrender their output at date 3?; and [2] will type-3 agents
monitor if total date 3 output falls below (N − F ) y? Since we are interested
in implementing a truth-telling equilibrium, let us suppose that all successful
environment characterized by asymmetric information, if a group of agents transforms
risky tokens issued by type-1 agents into riskless ones at date 3, they must also be willing
to perform, or at least manage, the task of monitoring in the event that total output
surrendered falls short of (1− λ)Ny. So, the set of agents that are involved in transforming
claims are also the set of agents who must manage monitoring. Since, without loss of
generality, we assume that the mechanism treats all date-1 issued claims symmetrically,
the set of agents who do the monitoring is the intermediary.
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type-1 agents surrender their output at date 3, and then examine whether,
conditional on this behavior, any individual type-1 agent has an incentive to
withhold his output. Note that such a deviation will be profitable if there is
even the smallest chance that the deviating type-1 agent escapes monitoring.
Therefore, any equilibrium requires that if total output is less than (N − F ) y,
then any agent who does not surrender output is monitored with probability
one.9
Suppose then that a successful type-1 agent does not surrender his output
at date 3. The above strategies imply that type-3 agents with tokens will
monitor all of the F +1 type-1 agents who did not surrender output. In this
case, the cost of monitoring is μ(F +1)/ (N − F ) utils for each type-3 agent
who monitors. This monitoring activity will recover y units of the “hidden”
output.
Whether type-1 agents have an incentive to surrender output depends on
whether the delegated monitors finds it sequentially rational to monitor in
the event of a defection. Let Um3 denote the expected payoﬀ to monitoring
and Un3 denote the expected payoﬀ to not monitoring. Then,
Um3 = y − μ
µ
F + 1
N − F
¶
and
Un3 =
µ
N − F − 1
N − F
¶
y.
Hence, type-3 agents will decide to monitor if Um3 ≥ Un3 , and Um3 ≥ Un3 if
and only if
y ≥ μ (F + 1) = μ (λN + 1) .
This inequality is obviously satisfied if μ = 0; but in general, we can
define a reservation monitoring cost μ∗ such that y ≡ μ∗ (λN + 1) or
μ∗ =
µ
y
λN + 1
¶
. (1)
We can conclude that monitoring by type-3 agents with money will be se-
quentially rational for any μ ∈ [0, μ∗].10 Hence, if μ is suﬃciently small in
9Implicitly, we assume that sequential monitoring of type-1 agents is not possible.
Allowing for this changes a bit of the arithmetic, but not our main conclusions.
10Suppose only a subset of type-3 agents with tokens decide to monitor after they observe
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this sense, then conditional on all other successful type-1 producing agents
surrendering their output, a successful type-1 producing agent will not have
an incentive to hide his output. In other words, the ex ante eﬃcient alloca-
tion can be implemented under an institutional arrangement that separates
the businesses of the money-issue from intermediation. Hence, a banking
arrangement is not essential. If, however, μ > μ∗, then the ex ante eﬃcient
allocation cannot be implemented under such an arrangement.
5.2 Type-1 Intermediation: Banking
Since type-1 agents can commit, the monitoring/intermediation function can
simply be delegated collectively to them. That is, when the type-1 agents
create their tokens (or liabilities) at date 1, they also commit to monitoring
all type-1 agents who do not surrender output at date 3, in the event that
aggregate output falls short of (N − F )y. Since this threat of monitoring
is credible, no type-1 agent has an incentive to hide output at date 3; any
hidden output will ultimately be discovered and confiscated. Hence, in equi-
librium, no monitoring will occur and the ex ante eﬃcient allocation can be
implementable regardless of the size of μ.
In the stark environment that we consider, a banking arrangement weakly
dominates an institutional arrangement that separates the businesses of money-
issue and intermediation over the entire parameter space and strictly domi-
nates for parameter configurations (y, μ, , λ,N) that satisfy y < μ (λN + 1).
It is in these latter cases that we say that banking is essential.
It is interesting to note that μ∗ is a decreasing function of N , see (1). It
is tempting to interpret N as a measure of population size. If this is the case,
then the model has a nice implication that banking arrangements are likely to
be more prevalent in larger economies (ceteris paribus, of course). The model
also suggests that banking arrangements are likely to be more prevalent in
environments where monitoring costs are high and/or the probability of fail-
ure is high, relative to the return to investment. The parameter μ reflects
the diﬃculty of acquiring information–say, in a bankruptcy proceeding–
and there is some reason to believe that this parameter may increase over
the amount the amount of output is (N − F − 1) y. Owing to the linearity of preferences,
the condition for monitoring for any subset of the type-3 agents with tokens is also given
by condition (1).
10
time as economic relationships and accounting practices grow in complexity.
6 Discussion
Our model is able to capture some, but certainly not all, aspects of the
development of money and banking in history. First, our model is consistent
with the idea that anyone with a capacity to issue money will endeavor to
do so to meet the demand for liquidity. Absent legal restrictions prohibiting
the practice of small note issue, this type of behavior is prevalent throughout
recent history. For example, Bodenhorn (1993) quotes an Italian General
Secretary of the Banco D’Italia how, prior to 1874, “everyone was issuing
notes, even individuals and commercial firms; the country was overrun with
little notes of 50, 25, and 20 centimes issued by everyone who liked to do so.”
The author also notes that when state legislation banned U.S. banks from
issuing notes of less than $5, railroad companies, public houses, merchants
and even churches filled the void with their own notes. Even Adam Smith
([1776] 1937, pp. 305—313) noted, with some disapproval one might add, how
small notes drove specie from the country.
One aspect of history that our model cannot account for is the wide-
spread regulatory eﬀorts that were expended to prohibit private small note
issue. One common argument was that holders of a few small notes had
little incentive to expend real resources on monitoring or determining au-
thenticity. Even those holding large quantities of notes may have had little
incentive to monitor, since others might have incentive to free-ride on their
eﬀorts. But as Bodenhorn (1993, pg.822) reports, in antebellum America,
at least, independent businessmen known as note brokers made markets in
banknotes; at the same time providing information and monitoring services.
This institutional setup bears some resemblance to the one that emerges in
our model where money-issue is separated from monitoring.
What, then, of the emergence of banking arrangements? The interpreta-
tion that we oﬀer here is not with respect to the emergence of agencies often
referred to as banks per se; but rather, the emergence of what one might
call a banking system, broadly defined to include regulatory agencies. As
noted by Klein (1974), many early U.S. banks became members of private
certifying and monitoring agencies, which performed some of the functions
similar to modern central banks. A famous example is the Suﬀolk banking
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system, e.g., see Smith and Weber (1999). In an interesting paper, Gorton
and Mullineaux (1987) argue that the capacity of private note brokers to
monitor and control the behavior of bank managers was increasingly eroded
as demand deposits came to supplant bank notes during the nineteenth cen-
tury. While our model is not rich enough to distinguish between bank notes
and demand deposits, this historical development can be thought of mani-
festing itself as an increase in our model parameter μ, and hence, an increase
in the likelihood of the emergence of banking.
7 Conclusion
We describe an environment where, absent record-keeping, money is essential.
Whether this money takes the form of a fiat token or of an explicitly backed
private liability is indeterminate, although we do argue that a fiat token in
conjunction with type 1 agents’ promises to surrender output amounts to
inside money. Either way, however, a specific subset of agents must initially
be in possession of the monetary instrument; whether it is endowed to them,
or whether they create it themselves, is irrelevant.
When the environment is further modified by assuming that idiosyncratic
production shocks are private information and that such information can
only be revealed through costly monitoring, some form of intermediation is
essential. This is to say that it becomes essential for some group of agents
to agree collectively monitor the issuers of some pool of securities. But it
is not obvious if it matters who these agents are. If monitoring costs are
suﬃciently small–in the sense that μ ≤ μ∗–then the monitoring function
can be delegated either to those who issue the money or to those who are
ultimately in a position to redeem it. On the other hand, if monitoring costs
are suﬃciently high–in the sense that μ > μ∗–then it is essential that the
monitoring function is delegated to those agents responsible for creating the
economy’s monetary instrument.
While our model is very simple, it arguably allows us to interpret some
aspects of the development of money and banking in recent history. As such,
the basic ideas embedded within the model may serve to develop a richer
class of models designed to explain more complicated aspects of the way
payments systems are organized and regulated.
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